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PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1997, the Federal Circuit decided Sage Products v. Devon,' in which the court
appeared to create a new doctrine limiting the scope of the doctrine of equivalents
in patent infringement cases. At the time, commentators dubbed this new
doctrine "patent drafter estoppel"2 and predicted that it would be "a significant
development favoring potential infringers." 3 In reality, however, the Federal
Circuit has backed away from creating such a "weapon for alleged infringers,"4
repeatedly holding that its decision in Sage Products represented nothing more than
a straightforward application of the well-known rule against using the doctrine of
equivalents to vitiate a claim limitation.
This Article will explore the Federal Circuit's failure to create the patent
drafter estoppel limitation and will attempt to determine whether the court's
decision was a good one from the perspective of advancing relevant patent law
policies. Part II will describe equivalent infringement analysis and the policies that
are sought to be advanced in the patent law system. Part III will examine Sage
Products itself. Part IV will discuss the two lines of thought that emerged after the
Sage Products decision was rendered. Finally, Part V will analyze these conflicting
interpretations with respect to their advancement of patent law policy and
determine whether the court's decision was consistent with patent law policy.
II. GENERAL PATENT LAW BACKGROUND
A. POLICIES AT WORK IN PATENT LAW
The United States patent law system is the result of several conflicting policy
goals. Several policies behind the patent system are dictated by the United States
Constitution, while others have been developed through case law to keep the
system functioning more smoothly.
The patent system is provided for in the United States Constitution, which
grants Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to . .. Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective . . . Discoveries."'  The grant of power provides the first policy
embodied in the patent system: grants of patents must "promote the Progress of
126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
2 Darius C. Gambino & Richard A. PaikoffA New WleaponforAlgedInfingers?: 'Patent Drafter
EstoppeI"Explored, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 469, 470 (2001).
4 Id at 469.
' U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
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Science and useful Arts."6 Generally, this means that the patent system must
operate in a way that promotes innovation. Also contained within the grant of
Congressional power is the patent system's second policy: by granting to
inventors only the "Right to their respective... Discoveries,"' the Constitution
ensures that the patent system will not operate in such a way as to remove
knowledge from the public domain. These twin policies---encouraging significant
innovation and ensuring that, once available to the public, knowledge is never
again made the subject of protection-form the constitutional underpinning of
the United States patent system.
Over time, the courts have refined these policies somewhat, defining several
goals for the patent system that allow concepts to be evaluated to determine
whether they are consistent with patent policy. The goal of encouraging
significant technological advances is still alive and well.' However, this goal is
now seen as one half of "a careful balance," the other side of which is
encouragement of "imitation and refinement through imitation."9 All patent
policies, therefore, must be interpreted in light of how well they advance the twin
goals of encouraging significant and pioneering technological advances and
encouraging design-around behavior and other secondary improvements.
The additional goals of the patent system are derived from these two
overarching principles. The constitutional mandate to ensure that knowledge,
once made available to the public, does not become the subject of patent
protection is enforced by a policy that "Congress may not authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available."'" The goal of
encouraging secondary innovation is advanced by the patent system's disclosure
requirements, which require an inventor to divulge enough about his invention
to enable others to make and use it before gaining protection for the idea. 1 The
patent system also requires disclosure sufficient to make the public aware of the
scope of issued patents and enable the public to avoid infringing the patents when
attempting to imitate or design around them.'
2
6 Id.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8 (emphasis added).
s See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) ("Whe
federal patent laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself
and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy.").
9 Id. at 146.
10 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
12 Id.; Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364,369 (1938) (noting that the strict
disclosure requirement "seeks to guard against unreasonable advantages to the patentee and
[Vol. 13:305
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Thus, any new concept that purports to change the patent system for the
better must support these five general policies, or at least must advance more of
them than it retards. First, it must encourage primary innovation-significant
advances in technology. Second, it must encourage design-around behavior or
other secondary innovation. Third, it must not allow knowledge that is already
freely available to the public to be removed from the public domain. Fourth, it
must encourage inventors to disclose their inventions fully in order to give those
skilled in the art the ability to make and use these inventions. Finally, it must
encourage inventors to disclose their inventions clearly in order to give adequate
public notice of the patent's existence and scope.
B. INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS
Once a patent is issued, the inventor (or the person to whom she assigns the
patent) has a right to exclude others from nearly any use of the patented
invention.13 In any case where patent infringement is at issue, the courts must
grapple with exactly how broad the patent's scope is and whether the alleged
infringer's product falls within that scope.
While the determination of a patent's scope might seem a simple matter of
construction, there are at least two problems that preclude such a rosy view of the
scope determination. First, the language used by the inventor in her patent
application may fall short of a perfect description of her invention, leading to
fights over exactly what the language means. Even the Federal Circuit, whose
mission is to create consistency by providing "a forum for appeals from
throughout the country in areas of the law [such as patent law] where Congress
determines that there is special need for national uniformity,"'4 has only recently
offered any guidance on exactly how to carry out such a fundamental task as
patent claim construction."5
disadvantages to others arising from uncertainty as to their rights"); McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S.
419, 424 (1891) (explaining that the purpose of the disclosure requirement "is not only to secure to
him all to which he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them').
13 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) ("[Whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention... infringes the patent.").
14 S. REP. No. 97-275, at 4 (1981), repnntedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14.
15 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). Before the en banc decision
in Phillips, there was a distinct lack of consistency in the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence in the area
of construing patent claim terms. CompareVitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (holding that all intrinsic evidence, including the claim language, the patent specification,
and the patent's prosecution history, must be evaluated before turning to extrinsic evidence, such
as dictionary definitions and expert testimony), with EMI Group N. Am., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157
F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that weighing all evidence, intrinsic or extrinsic, simultaneously
was acceptable); Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that
2006]
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Second, and more importantly for current purposes, accused devices may
infringe patents even when they do not fit within the exact limitations defined by
the patent claim language itself. Were patent scope limited to the literal scope
defined exactly by the language of patent claims, it would be possible for an
alleged infringer to escape liability for infringement by making only a few very
insubstantial changes to the patented invention. There would be no infringement
of the patent, since the alleged infringer would have produced a product outside
the scope of the patent's claims, but the infringer might still have practiced the
patented invention because language is an imprecise tool for describing the highly
technical concepts at issue in patent law.'6 To keep this situation from arising, to
keep people from "practic[ing] a fraud on a patent,"" the doctrine of equivalents
provides the patentee with scope beyond the literal words of her patent claims
and to the full extent of her actual invention.
When an accused infringer makes only insubstantial changes to a patented
invention, he is said to have infringed the patent under the doctrine of
equivalents, or to have committed equivalent infringement (as opposed to literal
infringement). Since Graver Tank, courts have generally (although not exclusively)
used the "function-way-result" test to determine whether an accused device is
equivalent to a given patent claim.' Under this test, if the accused device achieves
the same result as the patentee's invention and does so by "perform[ing]
substantially the same function in substantially the same way" as the patented
invention, there may be equivalent infringement. 9 Otherwise, the alleged
infringer's device has more than insubstantial changes from the patented
invention, and there is no infringement.
C. LEGAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
Perhaps because it is such a broadly stated doctrine, the doctrine of
equivalents is subject to some degree of abuse. When applied, it offers patentees
broader protection than they would be allowed under a strictly literal
courts should review dictionary definitions before considering any other evidence, including intrinsic
evidence, during patent claim construction).
16 This was discussed fully by the United States Supreme Court in Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v.
IjndeAirProd. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950) ('To prohibit [nothing but a literally infringing device]
would place the inventor at the mercy of verbalism and would be subordinating substance to
form.").
'7 Id. at 608.
's Id. (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)) ("[A] patentee may
invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.'").
19 Id
[Vol. 13:305
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interpretation of their claim language, with the result that competitors seeking to
design around the patent without committing infringement might have trouble
ascertaining the actual scope of the patent's claims. For this reason, several legal
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents have evolved. Each limitation restricts
the range of equivalents to which the patentee is entitled, controlling the
application of the doctrine of equivalents so as to limit its adverse effects on
public notice of patent claim scope.
1. The All-Elements Rule. In order to maximize the public notice of patent
claim scope provided by claim language, any finding of equivalent infringement
must be rooted in that language. Thus, any determination of the scope of
equivalents due a patent claim must take note of the language the patentee chose
to use to define her invention. The doctrine of equivalents is meant only to
correct for inevitable failures of language, not to substitute the court's judgment
for that of the patentee. In order to ensure the patentee's chosen language is not
forgotten in determining the proper scope of equivalents, the courts have
developed the all-elements rule.
Under the all-elements rule, the "function-way-result" test is to be applied to
each individual claim limitation separately, rather than to the claim as a whole.2 °
This approach prevents the doctrine of equivalents from being used "to
effectively eliminate [an] element in its entirety." 21 Since each patent claim
comprises multiple elements or limitations, and since "[elach element contained
in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented
invention, 22 the equivalency test must be applied to each element separately.
Because the all-elements rule protects the materiality of each claim limitation, it
is often described as a rule against vitiating a limitation.
2. Prosecution Histog Estoppel. As with the all-elements rule, the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel exists to limit the application of the doctrine of
equivalents. The Supreme Court has held that "[p]rosecution history estoppel
ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose. '
It does so by ensuring that, if a patentee voluntarily surrenders material during
patent prosecution, she cannot later reclaim that material under the doctrine of
equivalents.24 Although the exact contours of the doctrine are still being shaped
o Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997).
21 Id. at 29.
22 Id.
' Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 734 (2002).
24 Where the original application once embraced the purported equivalent but the
patentee narrowed his claims to obtain the patent or to protect its validity, the
patentee cannot assert that he lacked the words to describe the subject matter in
question. The doctrine of equivalents is premised on language's inability to
capture the essence of innovation, but a prior application describing the precise
2006]
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following the Festo decisions, prosecution history estoppel generally is applied
after a court undertakes two inquiries. First, the court must determine whether
the patentee made a narrowing amendment to his claim during patent
prosecution. 5 Second, the court must determine whether the amendment was for
a reason related to patentability. 6 Festo held that an amendment made to cure any
defect in the patent application was an amendment for reasons related to
patentability.27 If an amendment was both narrowing and for patentability
reasons, then prosecution history estoppel applies, and the patentee may be
precluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture any subject matter
she surrendered via the amendment.
3. Spedfication Dedication. Another legal limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents is the doctrine of specification dedication, as laid out in the majority
opinion in Johnson &Johnston Assocs. v. tRE. Serv. Co.2" Under this doctrine, when
the patentee discloses a range of possible equivalents in the patent's specification
but fails to claim some of them, she is deemed to have dedicated the unclaimed
equivalents to the public.29 They cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of
equivalents.
4. Prior Art Preclusion. The doctrine of prior art preclusion provides an
important and sometimes very broad limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
Under the prior art preclusion doctrine, the patentee cannot use the doctrine of
equivalents to gain protection for equivalent structures that are within the public
domain, such as structures that are part of the prior art.3" This ensures that the
doctrine of equivalents is not used to take knowledge out of the public domain
in violation of the policy underpinning the patent system. If an accused infringer
can demonstrate that his allegedly equivalently infringing device is only practicing
the prior art, he will be found not to infringe under the doctrine of equivalents,
element at issue undercuts that premise. In that instance the prosecution history
has established that the inventor turned his attention to the subject matter in
question, knew the words for both the broader and narrower claim, and
affirmatively chose the latter.
Id at 734-35.
" Id. at 736-37. "Narrowing" in this context suggests that the patentee surrendered subject
matter or equivalent structures that, in the absence of the amendment, he could have claimed.
26 id.
27 Id.
28 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
2 Id. at 1054 ("[W]hen a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter... this
action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public.").
o Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
("[Slince prior art always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it limits the range of
permissible equivalents of a claim.").
[Vol. 13:305
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since the doctrine of prior art preclusion will prevent the patentee from gaining
such broad protection.3
5. Specification Estppel. Specification estoppel, sometimes referred to as the
all-advantages rule, limits the doctrine of equivalents by requiring an infringing
equivalent to provide all the specified advantages of the patented invention.
Thus, when a patentee discloses in the patent specification multiple functions
performed by a given claim limitation, the accused device must perform all of
those functions in order to be found to infringe the patent.
3 2
The doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, the topic of this Article, would, if
adopted, join this list of legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. As
discussed below, the Federal Circuit appears to have declined to create such a
doctrine.
III. SAGE PRODUCTS: THE GENESIS OF PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL?
The case of Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. dealt with alleged
infringement of patents covering containers for safely "disposing of hazardous
medical waste, including hypodermic needles."3 3 In holding that the defendant
did not infringe the plaintiffs patents under the doctrine of equivalents, the
Federal Circuit at first blush appeared to have created a new legal limitation on
that doctrine. To understand the new "patent drafter estoppel" doctrine, it is
necessary to understand the facts of Sage Products.
Sage Products developed and patented "a disposal container ' '"4 for medical
waste. The container was designed so that a user could dispose of the waste
without coming into contact with any hazardous medical waste, such as used
hypodermic syringes, already deposited in the container.3" To accomplish this,
Sage Products designed its containers as closed vessels with elongated slots
protected by a closure mechanism with two constrictions, one above the slot and
one below it.
36
Sage Products' claim language reflected its design. As quoted by the court, the
relevant patent claim read as follows:
31 Id Note that the Federal Circuit has been clear that the burden is actually on the patentee to
show that her claims, as construed to cover the accused device under the doctrine of equivalents,
do not encompass any prior art, rather than on the accused infringer to demonstrate the opposite.
Id. at 685.
32 Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int'l, Inc., 141 F.3d 1084, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
13 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1422.
3' Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,779,728 (filed Nov. 27, 1987)).
35 Id
36 id
2006]
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1. A disposal container comprising:
a. a hollow upstanding container body,
b. an elongated slot at the top of the container body for permitting
access to the interior of the container body,
c. barrier means disposed adjacent said slot for restricting
access to the interior of said container body, at least a portion of
said barrier means comprising
i. afirst constriction extending over said slot, and
ii. a complementary second constriction extending
below said slot, and
d. a closure disposed adjacent said slot.37
The defendant in the case, Devon Industries, produced competing containers
for disposing of hazardous medical waste. Devon Industries' containers were
designed and constructed with a lid that could be lifted, exposing constrictions
inside the container that allowed needles to be deposited in the container but did
not allow a user to reach inside the container and contact previously disposed
waste.38 However, because any structure that could be called an elongated slot in
Devon Industries' containers was located inside the container body, rather than
"at the top of the container body,"39 as required by Sage Products' patent, the
court held that Devon Industries' products did not literally infringe the patent.'
As to equivalent infringement, the Federal Circuit noted that, since the Devon
Industries' product had its "first constriction," "elongated slot," and "second
constriction" located inside the container, rather than on top of the container, a
finding of equivalent infringement would improperly eliminate the element of
Sage Products' claim that required the elongated slot to be located "at the top of
the container body."41 However, the court then went on to discuss the "inherent
conflict between the role of the doctrine [of equivalents] in preventing 'fraud on
a patent' and the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of a patentee's
exclusive rights." 2
If the court did in fact create a new doctrine limiting the application of the
doctrine of equivalents, it must have done so in this latter discussion. In fact, the
Federal Circuit did note that Sage Products' patent covered "a relatively simple
structural device."43 Given this simplicity of design, "a skilled patent drafter
31 Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,779,728 (filed Nov. 27, 1987)) (emphasis in original).
3' Id at 1423.
39 U.S. Patent No. 4,779,728 (filed Nov. 27, 1982).
40 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1423, 1432.
41 Id. at 1424.
42 Id. (quoting Charles Greiner& Co. v. Mai-Med Mfg., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cit. 1992)).
41 Id. at 1425.
[Vol. 13:305
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would [have] foresee[n] the limiting potential of the 'over said slot' limitation."' "
The inventor (or his patent attorney) was not prevented by any "subtlety of
language or complexity of the technology" 4 from drafting a broader claim that
did not include this element. Thus, given the relative simplicity of the invention,
a reasonable inventor should have foreseen devices like the defendant's product
and could easily have drafted his claims more broadly so as to cover that product
literally.' Given that Sage Products opted not to draft theclaims this way, one
could argue that they intended to exclude from the scope of their patent claim
devices like that produced by Devon Industries.47
This discussion could certainly be interpreted as creating a new legal limitation
on the doctrine of equivalents. At least with "relatively simple structural
device[s],"4 like those at issue in Sage Products, the doctrine of patent drafter
estoppel seems to create a foreseeability limitation. While the doctrine of
equivalents may apply, its application is limited, and protection is not granted
against equivalent structures that the patentee reasonably should have foreseen
but chose not to claim. In fact, it is just this interpretation of Sage Products that
excited the patent law bar shortly after the decision was handed down.49
However, as discussed below, the subsequent interpretation of this case by the
Federal Circuit demonstrates that the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel does not
exist.
IV. DIVERGENCE OF OPINION FOLLOWING SAGE PRODUCTS
Following the decision in Sage Products, panels of the Federal Circuit appeared
to back away from the new doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, although
individual judges indicated in separate opinions that they believed such a doctrine
had been created.
44Id.
45 id.
Id. ("If Sage [Products] desired broad patent protection for any container that performed a
function similar to its claimed container, it could have sought claims with fewer structural
encumbrances.").
4' Id ("[A]s between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but
did not do so, and the public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek
protection for this foreseeable alteration of its claimed structure.").
48 id.
49 See, e.g., Gambino & Paikoff, supra note 2, at 470.
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A. OPINIONS APPLYING THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
As ostensibly articulated in Sage Products, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel
limits the application of the doctrine of equivalents by denying equivalent
protection against structures that, while equivalent to the claimed invention,
should have been foreseen by "[a] skilled patent drafter""° who was not prevented
by any "subtlety of language or complexity of the technology""s from drafting a
broader claim that would have covered the foreseen equivalent structure literally.
In two cases decided since Sage Products, separate opinions authored by Judge
Rader have adopted this doctrine as a new legal limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents.
1. Vehicular Technologies. The case of Vehicular Technologies Coop. v. Titan Wheel
International, Inc.52 is famous for articulating the all-advantages rule as a legal
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. However, in a concurring opinion,
Judge Rader argued that the case should have been decided on a different ground:
the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel articulated in Sage Products, rather than the
all-advantages rule, should have precluded the application of the doctrine of
equivalents. s3
Vehicular Technologies dealt with improvements to automobile locking
differentials, 4 and the relevant portion of the plaintiff's patent claimed a portion
of the invention as "two concentric springs bearing against one end of [a] pin.""5
The defendant's product avoided this limitation by using "a single spring and a
plug fitting into the spring" 6 instead. Although both Judge Rader and the panel
majority found no infringement, either literal or equivalent, Judge Rader would
have reached this result through the application of the patent drafter estoppel
doctrine.
Judge Rader saw a direct parallel between Vehicular Technologies and Sage
Products. In both cases, "a skilled patent drafter would readily foresee the limiting
potential of" the relevant patent claim limitation." In no case would the inventor,
patent agent, or attorney "confront the need for particularly subtle or ambiguous
language. Again, the patent drafter estoppel doctrine appears here as a
foreseeability limitation. If a reasonable inventor should have foreseen the
50 Sage Prodacts, 126 F.3d at 1425.
51 Id.
12 212 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
" Id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring).
"4 Id. at 1378-79.
" Id. at 1379 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,413,015 (filed June 28, 1993)).
56 Id
57 Id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring).
58 Id.
[Vol. 13:305
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defendant's product and still chose not to claim so as to cover that product
literally, the inventor cannot get patent protection against that product.
Judge Rader noted that the facts in Vehicular Technologies were particularly
damning from a patent drafter estoppel perspective. The plaintiff had initially
learned of the defendant's allegedly infringing product early enough that it could
still have sought a broadening reissue of its patent, redrafting its claims so as to
cover the defendant's product literally.59 Here, the plaintiff made two errors from
the perspective of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine. First, it did not draft its
claims broadly enough to cover products it should have foreseen.' Second, even
though it had an opportunity after learning of the infringement to redraft its
claims to cover actual products of which it was aware, it failed to take advantage
of that opportunity."
2. Johnson & Johnston Assodates. The majority in Johnson & Johnston Associates,
Inc. v. RE. Serice Co.62 used the Vehicular Technologies case to help establish the rule
that equivalent structures that appeared in the patent specification but were left
unclaimed cannot give rise to liability under the doctrine of equivalents.63 As in
Vehicular TechnologiesJudge Rader authored a concurring opinion, this time joined
by Chief Judge Mayer, arguing that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine should
have been applied.'
Johnson & Johnston Associates developed and patented a process for
protecting large sheets of thin copper foil, used in manufacturing printed circuit
boards, by attaching the foil to a sturdier metal substrate sheet."5 The patent
specification described substrate sheets made of several materials, including
aluminum, nickel alloys, stainless steel, and polypropylene.6 However, the claim
at issue referred specifically to aluminum substrates, omitting any reference to
sheets made of other materials.67
In his concurring opinion,Judge Rader once again employed the patent drafter
estoppel doctrine to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents. In terms
even more explicit than those employed in his concurrence in Vehicular
Technologies, he referred to patent drafter estoppel as a foreseeability limitation on
the doctrine of equivalents: "the doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject
s9 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 251).
60 id.
61 id
62 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
63 Id. at 1054-55. As the court noted, the specification dedication rule was first established in
Maxwe/v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
6 Johnson &Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring).
65 Id. at 1048-49 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,153,050 (filed Aug. 27, 1991)).
6 Id at 1050.
67 Id.
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matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the
application process and included in the claims."6 Adopting this reasoning would
help to balance "the preeminent notice function of patent claims" against "the
protective function of the doctrine of equivalents."69 Judge Rader made clear his
belief that what he termed a "foreseeability bar"7 had already been adopted by the
Federal Circuit in Sage Products.7
Thus, in both Vehicular Technologies and Johnson & Johnston Associates, some
Federal Circuit judges argued that the proper interpretation of Sage Products was
that the case had created a new doctrine placing a legal limitation on the
application of the doctrine of equivalents. This new doctrine precluded doctrine
of equivalents protection against equivalent structures that the patentee
reasonably should have foreseen during patent prosecution and neglected to claim
literally. However, as discussed below, the majority of the Federal Circuit judges
do not agree with this reading of Sage Products-, now that the case has been
interpreted multiple times, it can be said with confidence that the proper
interpretation of Sage Products is that it did nothing more than reaffirm and apply
the all-elements rule precluding a patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents
to entirely vitiate a claim limitation.
B. OPINIONS APPLYING THE ALL-ELEMENTS RULE
Under the Warner-Jenkinson all-elements rule, to equivalently infringe a patent,
the accused device must have an equivalent to each element of the relevant patent
claim."2 This requirement was not met in Sage Products, since any interpretation of
the claim that found equivalents to all the structural pieces required under the
claim required one or more of those structures to be in a location at odds with the
patent claim.v3 Under this interpretation of Sage Products, the Federal Circuit did
not actually create any new doctrine; it simply applied the uncontroversial all-
elements rule. The language in Sage Products that seems to create a doctrine
barring patentees from seeking protection for objectively foreseeable equivalents
is then dictum. This interpretation of the case has been adopted by the majority
in several Federal Circuit cases.
6' Id at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1057 (Rader,J., concurring).
71 Id at 1057-58 (Rader, J., concurring).
72 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29-30.
73 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1424 ("[E]ach theory [of equivalent infringement] suffers from one
of two alternative problems-either the elongated slot is not substantially 'at the top of the container
body' or there is no first constriction that extends substantially 'over said slot.' ").
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1. Overhead Door. Perhaps the clearest expression of the all-elements rule
interpretation of Sage Products comes in Overhead Door Corp. v. The Chamberlain
Group, Inc.74 This case involved a patent on improved automatic garage door
openers.75 The patentee had developed and patented a system whereby a garage
door opener could "learn" the codes associated with several transmitters; this
prevented the installer or user from having to set DIP switches identically on each
transmitter and on the garage door opener itself.76 The patent claimed a system
for allowing the opener to learn the code associated with a transmitter that
required the user to choose a memory location manually by setting a physical
switch.77 However, the accused device accomplished this learning function
automatically, using software to determine where in its memory to store the new
transmitter code.7' The district court had granted summary judgment to the
defendant, holding that the accused device did not infringe the patent either
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.79
In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that Sage
Products did not limit the scope of equivalents available to the patentee.' It
described the earlier case as applying a doctrine preventing the use of the doctrine
of equivalents to "utterly writ[e] out of the claim not one, but at least two (maybe
more) express limitations of the claim."'" The doctrine of equivalents argument
was clearly precluded by the actual, express language of the claim at issue. 2 This
is an interpretation of Sage Products as applying the all-elements rule. Noting that
the plaintiffs equivalence argument in OverheadDoor did not require the complete
vitiation of a claim element, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for
consideration of the doctrine of equivalents issue.83
Overhead Door did not expressly reject the patent drafter estoppel doctrine
interpretation of Sage Products, but it did characterize the earlier case in a radically
different way, as a simple application of the all-elements rule to "a relatively
simple structural device."' However, if Sage Products actually did create a new
doctrine limiting the application of the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit
has been remarkably reluctant to apply that doctrine. Overhead Door provided the
"' 194 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
75 Id at 1264 (citing U.S. Patent No. Re. 35,364 (filed Apr. 20, 1995)).
76 Id. at 1264-65.
" Id at 1265 (quoting U.S. Patent No. Re. 35,364 (filed Apr. 20, 1995)).
78 Id. at 1266.
79 id
8o Id at 1271.
81 Id.
82 I
83 Id.
84 Id. (quoting Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425).
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court with an opportunity to interpret Sage Products as creating the doctrine of
patent drafter estoppel, but the court declined the invitation and instead merely
applied an existing limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.
2. Johnson &$' Johnston Associates. As noted in Judge Rader's concurrence,
discussed above, the majority opinion in Johnson &JobnstonAssodates is consistent
with either interpretation of Sage Products. The Federal Circuit held that because
the patentee in Johnson & Johnston Associates had disclosed several possible
substrate materials but had chosen to claim only aluminum, there could be no
doctrine of equivalents protection against a defendant whose products used one
of the disclosed but unclaimed substrate materials.85 Judge Rader, in his
concurring opinion, argued that doctrine of equivalents protection was unavailable
because the disclosure of other substrate materials in the patent specification
showed that those materials were foreseeable to the patentee at the time of
application.86 However, the majority refused to go this far, holding instead that
disclosure of an equivalent combined with a failure to claim that equivalent
precluded protection for that equivalent because it showed a conscious decision
on the part of the patentee to dedicate the disclosed and unclaimed subject matter
to the public.8 7
Johnson &Jobnston Associates, then, is another example of the Federal Circuit's
reluctance to adopt patent drafter estoppel as a new legal limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents. As an en banc decision, it is highly indicative of the
opinion of the court as a whole, rather than simply of a few renegade judges. The
Federal Circuit seems either to believe that no new doctrine was created in Sage
Products or that the new doctrine should be subordinated to existing limits on the
doctrine of equivalents.
3. Fin Control Systems. The Federal Circuit also rejected the patent drafter
estoppel interpretation of Sage Productsin Fin Control Systems Pry, Lid. v. OAM, Inc. s8
This case involved a patent on removable fins for surfboards. 9 In relevant part,
the patentee had claimed a system for attaching the removable fins to a surfboard
that involved parts of the fin being "laterally engag[ed] ... [by] means applying
lateral force to" those parts.9" The allegedly infringing product used a similar
system that attached the removable fins to a surfboard at the front surface of the
85 Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
SId. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
87 Id. at 1054-55.
88 265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
89 Id. at 1313 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,464,359 (filed Mar. 9, 1992)).
" Id. at 1316 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,464,359 (filed Mar. 9, 1992)). The specification also
included language with the same "operating laterally" limitation. Id. at 1313 (quoting U.S. Patent No.
5,464,359 (filed Mar. 9, 1992)) ('The tabs may be fixed within the plug recesses by means which
laterally engage the tabs .... D.
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relevant structure (rather than at the left or right side, as would be required to
meet the "operating laterally" limitation).1
In holding that the accused product did not infringe the patent under the
doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit used Sage Products. The court affirmed
the lower court's holding that finding equivalent infringement "would improperly
read the 'lateral' and 'side' limitations out of [the claim at issue]."92 In making this
holding, the court cited Sage Products, implicitly suggesting that the holding of that
case related more to the rule against vitiating a claim limitation than to a new
doctrine imposing a foreseeability limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.93 In
a parenthetical comment, the court described Sage Products as holding that "reading
limitations out of the claims, including by interpreting limitations in such a way
that they do not have their normal meaning, is inappropriate in an analysis
pursuant to the doctrine of equivalents,"94 a clear endorsement of the view that
Sage Products merely applied the all-elements rule rather than creating a new
doctrine. Even the language used by Judge Rader to support the patent drafter
estoppel interpretation of Sage Products was appropriated by the majority in Fin
Control Systems as support for the all-elements rule interpretation.95
In Overhead Door and Johnson &Johnston Assodates, the Federal Circuit majority
was able to avoid adopting the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage
Products by applying an already-existing doctrine to limit the application of the
doctrine of equivalents, leaving open the question of whether, under some
circumstances, Sage Products might later be interpreted as Judge Rader suggested
it should be. Fin Control Systems forecloses this possibility, though, since the
language that arguably could support the patent drafter estoppel interpretation is
shown to be merely an amplification of the rule against entirely vitiating a claim
limitation.
4. SdMed Life Systems. In SdMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular
Systems, Inc.,96 the Federal Circuit clearly articulated its interpretation of the
ambiguous language in Sage Products. The earlier case was described as having
determined that because the scope of the claim was limited in a way
that plainly and necessarily excluded a structural feature that was the
opposite of the one recited in the claim, that different structure
91 Id. at 1314.
92 Id. at 1320.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing Sage Pmducts, 126 F.3d at 1424-26).
9' Id. at 1321 ("A skilled patent drafter would foresee the limiting potential of the ['lateral']
limitation.').
9 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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could not be brought within the scope of patent protection through
the doctrine of equivalents.97
This interpretation makes no mention of a foreseeability limitation; rather the
important inquiry under the SciMed Life Systems interpretation of Sage Products is
whether the patent in some way "clearly exclude[s] certain subject matter,
[thereby] implicitly disclaim[ing] the subject matter that was excluded.""8
From these cases, the appropriate interpretation of Sage Products can be
derived. Far from creating a new doctrine denying doctrine of equivalents
protection to objectively foreseeable equivalents, as suggested by Judge Rader, the
Federal Circuit merely reaffirmed the all-elements rule precluding a patentee from
reclaiming under the doctrine of equivalents subject matter that was disclaimed
under the literal claim language.
The cases interpreting Sage Products demonstrate the ways in which a patentee
might disclaim subject matter that could not be reclaimed under the doctrine of
equivalents. In Johnson & Johnston Associates, the patentee declined to claim an
allegedly equivalent structure, even though it described that structure in the patent
specification."9 In Fin ControlSystems, finding the defendant's structures equivalent
to the patent claim limitations would have required giving those limitations
meanings widely divergent from their normal definitions."° Sage Products, then,
merely provides yet another way in which a patentee can inadvertently disclaim
subject matter: the patentee in Sage Products worded its claim such that finding an
equivalent to one limitation necessarily required reading another limitation out of
the claim.' This final reading is the correct interpretation of Sage Products in light
of subsequent cases. A patentee cannot recover via the doctrine of equivalents
any subject matter that is disclaimed in her patent, either explicitly or implicitly.
Sage Products slightly expanded the all-elements rule; in addition to requiring an
equivalent to each element, the rule post-Sage Products clearly also precludes
eliminating one element in order to find an equivalent to another element.
V. SHOULD THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL INTERPRETATION
HAVE PREVAILED?
As is clear from the discussion above, the Federal Circuit has discarded the
patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage Products, and no such foreseeability
9 Id. at 1346.
98 Id.
285 F.3d at 1050.
100 265 F.3d at 1320.
101 126 F.3d at 1424.
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limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents appears to exist under
current Federal Circuit jurisprudence. Was this the correct interpretation? The
Federal Circuit had the opportunity after Sage Products to use the case to define a
new doctrine requiring patentees to claim literally any equivalent structure that
was reasonably foreseeable; was the court correct to decline to take this
opportunity? As shown below, these questions can be answered in the
affirmative. The court's decision was correct both because it avoided creating
intractable litigation problems and because it comports with relevant patent law
policy.
A. THE BEST ARGUMENT FOR THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
As Judge Rader phrased it, the best argument for adopting the doctrine of
patent drafter estoppel is that it greatly amplifies the degree to which patent claim
language can notify the interested public of the actual scope of issued patents."°2
This argument sounds reasonable in light of the enhancement to the public notice
function provided by other legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. In
fact, while each of the patent system policies discussed above 3 is advanced by
some limitations on the doctrine of equivalents and restrained by others, the
policy of providing the interested public with adequate notice of the scope of
issued patents is uniformly advanced by all of the existing doctrines limiting the
application of the doctrine of equivalents."1 4 When Judge Rader suggests that the
patent drafter estoppel doctrine will provide a similar "enhance[ment of] the
[public] notice function of claims," ' he is relying on this presumed truism: the
doctrine of equivalents limits the ability of the public to determine the scope of
an issued patent from documents that are publicly available, such as the patent
claims themselves, so any limitation on the application of the doctrine must
increase public notice. However, as discussed below," 6 the issue is not nearly this
simple, and Judge Rader's reliance proves ill-placed.
1. Encouraging Significant Technological Advances. While limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents consistently advance public notice, most of the doctrines
limiting the doctrine of equivalents do not help to encourage significant,
pioneering technical innovations, since these limiting doctrines generally operate
102 Johnson & Jobnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring) (the principle that "the
doctrine of equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have
foreseen during the application process and included in the claims.... enhances the notice function
of claims by making them the sole definition of invention scope in all foreseeable circumstances").
103 See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
'o4 See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
105 Johnson &Johnston Assos., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
loG See infra note 109 and accompanying text.
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by limiting the scope of protection available to the inventor, providing a smaller
reward for creating a pioneering invention and thereby reducing the incentive to
invent. However, the doctrine of prior art preclusion does at least indirectly
advance the policy of encouraging pioneering technical innovation. The prior art
preclusion doctrine precludes an inventor from receiving doctrine of equivalents
107protection against any equivalent structure which is a part of the prior art.
Thus, this doctrine tends to encourage inventors to direct their efforts towards
inventions that have few equivalents in the public domain. Pioneering inventions,
by definition, represent greater advances past the current state of the art than do
inventions merely refining existing technology. Thus, pioneering inventions are
incentivized by the doctrine of prior art preclusion.
While the prior art preclusion doctrine helps advance the goal of encouraging
significant technological advances, the other existing limitations on the doctrine
of equivalents do not advance this goal. Since the limiting doctrines have
inconsistent effects on the goal of encouraging pioneering technical advances, and
because most of these doctrines do not help achieve this goal, the advancement
of this policy cannot be the driving force behind the legal limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents. Like most of the limiting doctrines, the doctrine of
patent drafter estoppel also does not encourage inventors to pursue pioneering
technical innovations.
2. Encouraging Refinement Through Imitaion. In contrast to the policy of
encouraging significant technological advances, the limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents generally do help achieve the goal of encouraging modest advances in
technology and refinement through imitation. In each case, the limiting doctrine
increases public notice of the scope of issued patents, which makes it easier for
inventors to improve upon previously patented inventions without fear of being
accused of infringement.
Once again, the exception to the general trend is the doctrine of prior art
preclusion. This doctrine merely allows the public the freedom to practice the
prior art when they might not otherwise be able to do so. Since the prior art
represents neither a significant technological advance nor a modest advance
achieved through refinement, allowing the public to practice the prior art can
hardly be said to advance either policy encouraging technological innovation.
However, because prior art preclusion has a different effect on the goal of
encouraging refinement through imitation than do the other legal limitations on
the doctrine of equivalents, this policy goal cannot be the chief driving force
behind those limiting doctrines.
107 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677,684 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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3. Preserving Knowledge Already in the Public Domain. With the exception of prior
art preclusion, none of the doctrines limiting the application of the doctrine of
equivalents has any great effect on achieving the goal of denying patent protection
for any knowledge already within the public domain. For the most part, these
legal limitations limit patent scope by denying protection to equivalent structures
that are neither in the public domain nor protected under the literal language of
the patent claims.
As with the policies of encouraging primary and secondary inventiveness, the
exception here is again the doctrine of prior art preclusion. By denying the
patentee protection for equivalent structures that appear in the prior art and that
are therefore in the public domain, this doctrine helps to preserve the integrity of
the public domain. Under the doctrine of prior art preclusion, patent protection
is simply not available, under either a literal infringement or an equivalent
infringement theory, for anything already available to the public.
Again, the various legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents have
differing effects on the advancement of the policies at work in the patent system.
The doctrine of prior art preclusion advances the goal of denying protection for
knowledge already within the public domain, while the remaining doctrines have
no effect on the achievement of this goal. Since the doctrines largely do not
advance this policy, and since they have differing effects, protecting the integrity
of the public domain cannot be the driving force behind limitations on the
doctrine of equivalents.
4. Encouraging Complete and Adequate Disclosure of Inventions. Perhaps the most
complicated set of effects on patent policy of the various doctrine of equivalents-
limiting doctrines occurs in the area of encouraging complete disclosure of new
inventions. This policy does not drive the limits on the doctrine of equivalents,
since the limiting doctrines, to the extent they have any effect at all, generally have
negative effects on the advancement of the goal of complete disclosure.
Neither the all-elements rule nor prior art preclusion has any significant effect
on encouraging complete disclosure of inventions. However, the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel negatively impacts the policy of encouraging
inventors to disclose their inventions fully. By making greater disclosure during
patent prosecution, the patentee provides later accused infringers with the
ammunition needed to mount a defense based on prosecution history estoppel.
Thus, greater disclosure results in a patent whose scope is more limited. Patent
applicants naturally seek the broadest patent protection possible, so the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel creates an incentive to disclose as little as possible.
The doctrine of specification dedication operates in a similar way. By
removing from the scope of an issued patent any equivalent structures that appear
in the specification but not in the literal claim language, this doctrine creates an
incentive for patentees to disclose no more than absolutely necessary for their
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claims to be allowed. This is contrary to the patent policy of encouraging full
disclosure of inventions.
While the doctrine of specification dedication might discourage a patentee
from disclosingwhat he considers unpatentable equivalent structures, the doctrine
of specification estoppel, or the all-advantages rule, creates an incentive for patent
applicants to avoid disclosing all the advantages their design might possess. Any
advantage disclosed could potentially be used against the patentee later to limit the
scope of protection afforded under the issued patent.
Thus, the policy of encouraging complete disclosure of inventions cannot be
the chief driving force behind the various legal limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents. At best, those limiting doctrines have no effect on the advancement
of the disclosure policy, and at worst they discourage efforts to achieve full
disclosure.
5. Increasing Public Noice of tbe Scope oflssuedPatents. The final patent law policy,
that of ensuring that the interested public is well-informed of the scope of issued
patents, is advanced by all of the doctrines that limit the application of the
doctrine of equivalents. This policy, then, must be the main driver behind the
limitations, and an argument that the new doctrine of patent drafter estoppel
advanced this policy would therefore be the best argument for the adoption of the
new doctrine.
With the all-elements rule, the interested public is at least made aware of the
elements that must be present to infringe an issued patent. This allows later
inventors seeking to design around the patent to focus their efforts on removing
an element or creating a design with a non-equivalent structure in place of a
necessary element. Without the all-elements rule, the doctrine of equivalents
might be applied to a patent claim as a whole, greatly expanding the number of
possible equivalent structures and making the exact scope of the patent claim
difficult to ascertain. Thus, the all-elements rule advances the patent system's goal
of increasing public notice of the scope of issued patents.
Similarly, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel greatly advances the
interested public's knowledge of the scope of issued patents. The doctrine limits
the scope of issued patents based entirely upon the prosecution history, which is
available to any interested member of the public. The limitation is also applied
in a mostly predictable way. At the very least, with the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel, the interested public knows that no equivalent structures
disclaimed in the prosecution history may be claimed under the doctrine of
equivalents.
Specification dedication has a similar effect on the goal of increasing public
notice of the scope of issued patents, although its effect is smaller than that of
either the all-elements rule or the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel. With
the doctrine of specification dedication, competitors and other interested
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members of the public know for certain that any equivalent structure disclosed
in the specification but not claimed is fair game for use in an invention that
attempts to design around the patent in question. Without the doctrine, these
structures might be within the scope of patent protection under the doctrine of
equivalents, and competitors might be forced to guess at the actual scope of the
patent.
Similarly, the doctrine of prior art preclusion makes it clear to the interested
public that any equivalent structure falling within the public domain may be
incorporated into a later invention. The rule helps to make the limits of patent
scope clear to the public.
Finally, the doctrine of specification estoppel helps to increase public notice
of the scope of issued patents by making the scope of patent protection depend
upon the advantages disclosed in the specification. The specification is public
information, easily available to anyone aware of the patent. The specification
estoppel doctrine ensures that the publicly-known specification is tied to the
scope of patent protection, increasing public notice of the patent's scope.
Thus, the existing doctrines that limit the application of the doctrine of
equivalents all advance the patent system's goal of increasing public notice of the
scope of issued patents. If there is an argument to be made for the adoption of
the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, it must be that it also helps achieve this goal.
This benefit is exactly what the proponents of the new doctrine suggest. In his
concurrence in Johnson &Johnston Assodates, Judge Rader suggests that adopting
the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would "enhance[ ] the notice function of
claims."'0 8 The reasoning behind this view is simple and, at first glance, beguiling.
The doctrine of equivalents provides a patentee with a broader scope of
protection than mere literal interpretation of his patent claims would allow. This
excess protection is ill-defined, since its contours are never explicitly located and
are held to encompass a particular device only after extensive litigation. Thus, the
doctrine of equivalents is a barrier to achieving complete public notice of the
scope of patent claims. Any limitation on the application of the doctrine of
equivalents, then, must increase public notice. As shown below,' 9 even this best
argument for the adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine does not hold
up under closer scrutiny.
B. LITIGATION IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
Had the Federal Circuit created a new patent drafter estoppel doctrine in Sage
Products, it would have created serious problems for patent infringement litigants
108 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring).
10' See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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and for courts adjudicating patent infringement cases. Thus, the court made the
correct decision when it declined to interpret its Sage Products decision as creating
such a doctrine.
To understand the problems the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would create
in patent infringement litigation, one need only recognize that the doctrine would
require the court to assess whether a given structure, found to be equivalent to a
limitation contained in the patent claim at issue, would have been foreseeable to
the reasonable inventor at the time the patentee applied for her patent." The
term of a patent generally ends twenty years after the date on which the patent's
application was filed."' Thus, a foreseeability determination under the patent
drafter estoppel doctrine might be made as long as twenty years after the date on
which the foreseeability is to be evaluated."' In many cases, the patent itself
would offer insufficient evidence to determine exactly what was foreseeable at the
time the patent was prosecuted. Thus, expert testimony would be needed,
creating a significant new expense for litigants on both sides and requiring judges
and juries to assess the credibility of witnesses in an entirely new area.
In many ways, the foreseeability determinations that would need to be made
under the patent drafter estoppel doctrine resemble the determinations that courts
already struggle with in the area of patent obviousness. Obviousness
determinations require the court to investigate whether the invention "would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which [the invention] pertains.""' 3 This is similar to the foreseeability
determination that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would require, because it
forces courts to evaluate the knowledge of typical practitioners in a relevant field
at a point in time remote from that when the determination is made.
Given that the two determinations are qualitatively similar, they might be
expected to experience similar pitfalls. For example, in determining whether an
invention is obvious, courts have been warned against using hindsight, since all
inventions seem more obvious after they are made than they did beforehand."
4
To ensure that the disclosure of the patentee's own invention is not used against
her in order to render the invention obvious, courts have developed "objective
"' Johnson &JobnstonAssocs., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring); Vehicular Techs., 212 F.3d
at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring).
m 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
12 In fact, given that litigation in patent infringement cases can be lengthy, the determination may
occur even later than this.
113 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
1 W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540,1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that
courts should avoid "fal[ing] victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that
which only the invention taught is used against its teacher").
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evidence of nonobviousness,"" 5 factors which must be considered when making
an obviousness determination. These factors include "commercial success, long
felt but unsolved needs, [and] failure of others," ' 1 6 and, "when present [they must]
always be considered as an integral part of the analysis."
'
"
7
Determination of a given equivalent structure's foreseeability at the time of
patenting would suffer from a similar problem. At the time of litigation, the
defendant (and possibly others as well) will have developed the equivalent in
question. It is not difficult to imagine the existence of the equivalent structure
offering courts an opportunity to improperly use hindsight to determine that a
reasonable inventor should have been able to foresee the equivalent at the time
the patent was applied for. Objective considerations similar to those used in
obviousness determinations would need to be developed, and these
considerations would greatly add to the length and complexity of patent
infringement litigation.
The difficulty inherent in making foreseeability determinations in patent
infringement cases is not immediately apparent from the cases in which Judge
Rader argued that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine should be applied. Sage
Products, Vehicular Technologies, and Johnson &JohnstonAssociates all involved patents
that provided completely intrinsic evidence of objective foreseeability of
equivalents, making resort to evidence outside the patent unnecessary. In Sage
Products, the invention was "a relatively simple structural device,"" 8 something that
surely is not guaranteed in all doctrine of equivalents cases. A much more
complicated invention would lead to foreseeability determinations that were more
difficult to make and therefore required much more information and a greater
commitment of judicial resources.
In Johnson & Johnston Associates, the equivalents in question were actually
disclosed in the specification without being claimed." 9 Clearly, if the patentee
itself knew enough about the equivalent substrate materials to disclose them at the
time it filed its patent application, those equivalent materials were foreseeable.
Thus, the foreseeability determination in Johnson &Johnston Associates was trivial,
masking the difficulty of the determination process in the typical patent
infringement case.
Similarly, the patentee in Vehicular Technologies was aware of the defendant's
equivalent structure very shortly after receiving its patent, since it had the
opportunity to seek a broadening reissue that encompassed the defendant's
11 Id. at 1555 (citing In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
116 Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
117 Wr.L Gore &Assocs., 721 F.2d at 1555.
11 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425.
'19 Johnson &JohnstonAssocs., 285 F.3d at 1050.
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product in its literal claim language.Y The period during which a broadening (as
opposed to a narrowing) reissue can be sought is only "two years from the grant
of the original patent.' 2' Development of an equivalent within such a short time
period may suggest that, at the time the patent was issued, there is a good chance
that the equivalent technology was foreseeable. Such circumstances are unlikely
to be present in all doctrine of equivalents cases, though., Judge Rader's patent
drafter estoppel doctrine may be capable of being applied in cases where
foreseeability determinations are so easy to make, but its application in more
complicated cases would likely be much more impractical. Given that similar
limits on the doctrine of equivalents are possible using only already-existing
doctrines, the need for such an expensive and cumbersome new doctrine seems
unclear.
C. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL DOCTRINE
In addition to creating serious practical problems for litigants and courts, the
adoption of the patent drafter estoppel would be detrimental to the policies
underlying the patent law system. Those policies include encouraging significant
technological advances," encouraging secondary advances in technology that
build upon prior significant advances,'" ensuring that no knowledge is removed
from the public domain,124 encouraging dissemination of technological
information via disclosure of new inventions,12 and ensuring that the scope of
issued patents is clear so that competitors can operate without committing
infringement.'26 The patent drafter estoppel doctrine generally does a poor job
of advancing these policy goals, compared with simple application of existing legal
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.
1. Encouraging Significant Technological Advances. A primary purpose of the
patent law system is to encourage significant, pioneering technological
advances.2 7 This goal is achieved "by securing... to ... Inventors the exclusive
Right to their... Discoveries.' 28 Because the patentee has a right to exclude
others from practicing the invention, she can invest time, money, and effort in
opening a new area of technology, secure in the knowledge that her patent will
2i' Vebicular Techs., 212 F.3d at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring).
12t 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
122 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1989).
123 Id at 146.
124 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
12s 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
'2 Id.; Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (1938).
I2 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146-47.
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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allow her to recoup her investment through sales in a market where no one else
is allowed to compete without first getting her permission. Because it depends
for its advancement upon the creation of a patent monopoly, the goal of
encouraging pioneering inventions is most greatly advanced when the terms of
that monopoly are most favorable to the inventor. Thus, any restriction in the
subject matter the patentee may protect under her patent reduces the incentive to
invent and acts as a barrier to achieving the policy goal of encouraging pioneering
technological advances.
From the perspective of this policy, the doctrine of equivalents is a useful tool.
At worst, it ensures that the patent right is not completely gutted of all meaning,
since it allows the patentee to defend her patent rights even when an infringer
makes a few insubstantial changes to the invention. At most, it allows the
patentee somewhat broader coverage than she would be allowed under her literal
language. Either way, the scope of the patentee's right to exclude is greater with
the doctrine of equivalents than without it. The doctrine of equivalents thus helps
to encourage the development of significant and pioneering inventions.
If the doctrine of equivalents helps achieve the policy goal of encouraging
significant technological advances, any legal limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents must frustrate that goal. This is not to suggest that some limits are
not necessary. After all, the language of the claims is paramount, and the doctrine
of equivalents cannot be used to grant the patentee protection against equivalent
structures that are clearly excluded by her chosen claim language. 29 However, the
imposition of a new legal limitation, such as that represented by the patent drafter
estoppel doctrine, is contrary to the policy of encouraging inventors to invest time
and effort in developing pioneering technological advances.
2. Encouraging Secondary Technological Advances. The patent system seeks to
encourage significant and pioneering technological innovations, but this is not the
only goal of the system. It is balanced against "the recognition that imitation and
refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very
lifeblood of a competitive economy."" 3  This balance recognizes that an
important goal of the patent system is to encourage inventors to build upon the
earlier advances of others. The patent system is designed to achieve this goal by
requiring patentees to disclose their inventions before being granted patent
protection. The disclosure of new inventions helps educate the interested public
about the current state of the art, suggesting new avenues of inquiry and
providing a baseline for further innovation.
129 SdMedLife Sys., 242 F.3d at 1345 ("A particular structure can be deemed outside the reach of
the doctrine of equivalents because that structure is clearly excluded from the claims . . .
130 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146.
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Unlike the encouragement of primary innovation, the goal of encouraging
secondary innovation is frustrated by a strong doctrine of equivalents. If the
doctrine of equivalents is relatively unrestricted, patentees may use it to foreclose
experimentation by others in areas closely related to the patented technology (but
outside the literal claim language). By contrast, a closely circumscribed doctrine
of equivalents allows secondary inventors to focus their efforts in technical areas
very closely related to the patent in question without running the risk of infringing
the patent. Thus, any legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents will help to
achieve the goal of encouraging secondary innovation via "refinement through
imitation.'
13 1
As a new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, then, the doctrine of
patent drafter estoppel could be expected to advance the policy goal of
encouraging secondary innovation. Assuming that patentees would not radically
change their claim drafting strategy in response to the new limitation, the doctrine
of patent drafter estoppel would limit the range of equivalents available to a
patent holder. Since fewer equivalent structures would therefore be protected
under the patent, the patentee would have less ability to interfere with later
innovators operating in closely related areas. With greater freedom to investigate
related technologies, secondary innovators would be more encouraged to
continue their work were the Federal Circuit to adopt the doctrine of patent
drafter estoppel.
3. Ensuring No Knowledge is Removed from the Public Domain. In addition to
balancing the encouragement of primary and secondary invention, the patent law
system also has several other policy goals, including ensuring that no invention or
knowledge becomes protected under a patent once it has entered the public
domain.'32 Neither the doctrine of equivalents nor its associated legal limitations
have any significant effect on the achievement of this policy goal.
The classic operation of the doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee
protection against products developed during his patent term that use technology
that did not exist at the time the patent was applied for and issued, if those
products accomplish the same result as the invention and do so in substantially
the same way in order to carry out substantially the same function.'33 This simply
131 id.
132 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) ("Congress may not authorize the issuance
of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free
access to materials already available.').
"' Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605,607 (1950) ("[A] patentee may
invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device 'if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.'" (quoting
Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30,42 (1929))); see, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United
States, 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that the doctrine of equivalents provided protection
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gives the patentee protection against any embodiment of his invention, rather
than only the subset of embodiments that can be easily described at the time the
patent is prosecuted. The operation of the doctrine of equivalents has no effect
on the removal of knowledge from the public domain, since this goal is achieved
or frustrated at the time a patent is issued. Once the patent is issued, its scope is
fixed, and any knowledge that will be removed from the public domain because
of the patent is removed from the public domain at that point. While the
operation of the doctrine of equivalents determines exactly what the scope of the
patent will be, it is the issuance of the patent, rather than the exact scope of the
patent, that determines whether knowledge is taken out of the public domain and
made subject to patent protection.
Because the doctrine of equivalents itself has no effect on the advancement
or frustration of the policy goal of ensuring that no knowledge already in the
public domain becomes protected by a patent, no legal limitation on the doctrine
of equivalents can affect the achievement of this goal. As a legal limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents, patent drafter estoppel would therefore be neutral with
respect to ensuring that knowledge in the public domain remains there.
4. Encouraging Full Disclosure of New Inventions. The patent system is designed
to encourage full disclosure of new inventions, since this helps to ensure that
society gets the maximum informational benefit from the patent quid pro quo.13 1
This goal focuses not on the patent claims, but rather on the patent specification,
where the patentee is to provide a complete description of the invention sufficient
"to enable any person skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains... to
make and use the [invention] .. .."" The doctrine of equivalents, as an
infringement doctrine, does not create any significant incentive either for or
against full disclosure, since it focuses in its operation on the patent's claims and
the accused device.
However, the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, if adopted, might create an
incentive not to disclose inventions absolutely fully. In determining whether a
given equivalent structure was foreseeable at the time the patent in question was
prosecuted, a court will need contemporary evidence, and the court will likely find
it necessary to examine the patent specification as a portion of that contemporary
evidence. Judge Rader's concurrence in Johnson & Johnston Associates provides a
clear example of this tendency. There, the evidence that substrate materials other
than aluminum were foreseeable at the time of patent prosecution was provided
by the patent specification's reference to other substrate materials, including steel,
against a satellite incorporating recently-developed computer technology to accomplish on board the
same function that the patent claimed would be performed by satellite operator on the ground).
'34 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
135 Id. This is known as the enablement requirement.
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the material used by the defendant. 6 Without a broad disclosure like that in
Johnson & JobnstonAssociates, it would be more difficult for a court conclusively to
determine that a particular equivalent should have been foreseen.
Thus, were patent drafter estoppel to be adopted, unscrupulous patentees
would have a reason to hide equivalent structures that they foresaw by failing to
disclose them at all. In this way, they could ensure that full disclosure could not
be used against them later. Patent applicants and their agents or attorneys would
operate under the maxim "Aut tace, aut loquere meliora silentio."'37 The goal of
encouraging full disclosure of inventions to ensure that society receives the
maximum return for its grant of monopoly power would be frustrated.
5. Providing Adequate Pubh'c Notice of the Scope of Issued Patents. The final policy
underlying the patent system is that proper notice should be given to the public
of the existence of issued patents and the scope of those patents. 3 ' This notice
is necessary to allow competitors the opportunity to conduct their business
without infringing the patent, and it assists secondary innovators in determining
what areas of technology need investigation and which areas are closed to further
investigation because they are the subject of patent protection.
To a certain degree, the doctrine of equivalents frustrates this policy goal. If
patents could be infringed only by producing devices falling within the literal
claim language, the scope of patent protection would be eminently clear. By
creating a penumbra of protection surrounding the literal claim language, though,
the doctrine of equivalents reduces the ease with which the scope of an issued
patent can be determined. Competitors and secondary innovators must make
their best guess as to what similar techniques, structures, and approaches the
courts will deem equivalent.'39 If they are particularly risk-averse, competitors and
secondary innovators will structure their activities so as to avoid any conceivably
equivalent device, greatly restricting the amount of further research and
"refinement through imitation" that the patent system is supposed to encourage.
Since the doctrine of equivalents frustrates the policy goal of providing
adequate public notice of the scope of issued patents, any limitation on the
doctrine of equivalents should help achieve that goal. 4' However, one should
136 Johnson & Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1050.
137 "Be quiet, unless your speech be better than silence." See National Gallery, London, Self
Portrait ofSalvator Rosa (c. 1645), availabk athttp://www.nationalgaflery.org.uk/cgi-bin/WebObjects.
dl/CollectionPublisher.woa/wa/work.workNumber=NG4680 (last visited Apr. 14, 2006).
138 Johnson &Johnston Assocs., 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring) (describing patent claims
as "providing the public with adequate notice of potentially infringing behavior").
139 This is perhaps not quite as bad as it sounds, since even in the absence of the doctrine of
equivalents, competitors seeking to operate in technical areas near the patent without infringing it
will need to make their best guess as to the way a court will construe the literal claim language.
" See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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resist the temptation to think that all legal limitations on the doctrine of
equivalents are equally effective in reducing the size of the penumbra surrounding
the literal claim language. In fact, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, if
adopted, might make matters worse rather than better.
The concern with the doctrine of equivalents is that it does not permit
competitors to determine the best course of action to avoid infringement a priori,
because the determination of which structures are equivalent to the claim
limitations at issue can be accomplished only by a court after the fact. The
adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine as a limitation on the doctrine of
equivalents would not eliminate this problem, since the doctrine of equivalents
would still be operable. The new doctrine would merely add yet another post
facto inquiry to the doctrine of equivalents analysis. As with claim construction,
determination of the foreseeability of a particular equivalent requires
consideration of evidence not a part of the public record, such as expert witness
testimony. The determination of whether an equivalent structure was objectively
foreseeable at the time the patent in question was prosecuted simply cannot be
carried out by a competitor or secondary innovator seeking the appropriate course
of action; it must be accomplished by a court after the fact.
Without the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, a party interested in avoiding
patent infringement need only make two guesses as to the scope of the patent.
First, the party must try to determine how the patent claims will be construed.
Second, the party must guess what structures will be held equivalent to the
limitations of the claims as construed. The party may then proceed with its
business in such a way that it does not use any structures that it believes will fall
within either the construed literal claim language or the scope of equivalents to
the claims.
Were the patent drafter estoppel doctrine to be adopted, competitors and
secondary innovators would still be required to make these same inquiries before
undertaking any activity within a technology area closely related to that covered
by the patent in question. They would also need to make an additional guess
about what a court would hold, though: in addition to trying to determine
whether a contemplated structure would fall within the literal claim language or
would be considered equivalent to a claim limitation, they would be required to
guess whether the court would find the structure an objectively foreseeable
technological development. The patent drafter estoppel doctrine thus increases
the uncertainty surrounding the scope of issued patents, rather than decreasing
it. The doctrine runs contrary to the policy goal of ensuring that there is adequate
public notice of the scope of issued patents.
The patent drafter estoppel doctrine, then, generally would cause more
problems than it would solve. The need for objective indicia of foreseeability and
the requirement for additional extrinsic evidence would greatly complicate patent
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infringement litigation. At the cost of making litigation more cumbersome, no
policy goal of the patent law system would be advanced more than moderately,
and more goals would be frustrated than would be advanced. The policy goals of
encouraging significant and pioneering technological advances, encouraging full
disclosure of new inventions, and ensuring that there is adequate public notice of
the scope of protection under issued patents would all be frustrated by the
adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine. The doctrine is neutral as to the
policy goal of ensuring patent protection is not given to any knowledge already
within the public domain. It would only advance the goal of encouraging
secondary innovation via "refinement through imitation." The advancement of
this single goal is not worth the frustration of several other policies, particularly
when one considers the additional litigation costs that would be incurred were the
doctrine to be adopted.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sage Products decision presented the Federal Circuit with an opportunity
to adopt a new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, the patent drafter
estoppel doctrine. This new doctrine would have limited the application of the
doctrine of equivalents by precluding equivalent infringement protection for any
equivalent structure that the patentee reasonably should have foreseen during
patent prosecution. Since Sage Products, the Federal Circuit appears to have
declined the invitation to create this new foreseeability limitation on the doctrine
of equivalents. This course of action was wise because the patent drafter estoppel
doctrine would have caused patent infringement litigation to grow more
cumbersome and expensive with no corresponding increase in the advancement
of patent law policy goals. In fact, the new doctrine would have frustrated more
patent system policies than it advanced. In short, the doctrine of patent drafter
estoppel is dead and should stay dead.
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